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‘‘Governance by disclosure” has become a deﬁning feature
of global governance, and one that extends well beyond
state-led eﬀorts at international regime building. To an
increasing extent, private actors such as ﬁrms and non-
governmental organizations are becoming involved in the
design and operation of transnational rules that aim to
increase transparency. Examples of such private or hybrid
schemes can be found in issue areas as diverse as labor rights,
environmental protection, accounting, and telecommunica-
tions. 1
While previous studies have examined the emergence,
institutionalization, and accountability of such transnational
standards for transparency, less is known about their eﬀective-
ness. 2 This study statistically explores the eﬃcacy of transna-
tional disclosure standards for the important case of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI
was created in 2002 to improve the domestic governance in
resource-rich countries by bringing more transparency and
more accountability to the collection of revenues. The EITI
was structured as a transnational public–private partnership,
bringing together resource-rich development countries, private
actors such as transnational corporations and investor
associations, and civil society organizations.
The EITI oﬀers a useful template for which to assess the
value of transparency, if any, on the international stage. The179EITI attempts to promote global transparency for the oil,
gas, and mining sectors—sectors that are notorious for their
opacity. 3 The EITI operates on the principle of having free,
full, independent, and active assessments of the ways that
extractive industries companies interact with government
and impact communities and society. 4
As of November 2015, 31 countries were ‘‘EITI Compliant”
and another 49 were ‘‘EITI Candidates.” In total, 49 countries
had disclosed payments and revenues worth some $1.67 tril-
lion in more than 200 ‘‘EITI Reports”, and over 90 major
companies involved in oil, gas and mining are committed to
supporting the EITI. 5 The EITI has also received support
from 84 global investment institutions that collectively manage
about $16 trillion in energy infrastructural assets. 6 Moreover,
the European Union, African Union, G8 and G20, and the
United Nations have all endorsed the EITI.
In this article, we ask: does the EITI make a diﬀerence?
Does the transparency engendered by the EITI actually result
in better governance and development outcomes in EITI com-
pliant countries? How well do EITI countries perform, or
improve over time, compared to other countries on selected
political and economic indicators? To answer these questions,
this study analyzes the performance of the ﬁrst 16 countries
that attained EITI Compliance Status as of 2012 on a variety
180 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof diﬀerent governance and economic development metrics
over the period 1996–2014. More speciﬁcally, using non-
parametric tests, regression analysis and data from the World
Bank, we test how EITI countries performed over time relat-
ing to eight distinct metrics covering accountability, political
stability, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, corruption, foreign direct investment, and growth in per
capita GDP.
We ﬁnd, interestingly, that in most metrics EITI countries
do not perform better during EITI compliance than before
EITI compliance, and that in most metrics they do not outper-
form other countries. To interpret this outcome, we postulate
four possible explanations: the EITI’s limited mandate, its vol-
untary nature, resistance by key stakeholders, and the absence
of strong civil society actors in host countries. Our results
should be approached with caution. Since we cannot assign
units randomly to an experimental and control group, our
analysis follows a quasi-experimental design and allows for
only correlative interpretations regarding the relationship
between EITI participation and governance and economic
development metrics. It does not include other factors which
might interact with the EITI scheme. Moreover, the countries
in our sample only recently gained Compliance Status, and it
might be too soon to empirically observe anything other than
incremental changes in governance. Nevertheless, our analysis
oﬀers grounds to be skeptical and calls for further research
into the eﬀectiveness of transnational disclosure-based gover-
nance schemes.
The analysis proceeds as follows. It ﬁrst reviews the litera-
ture on the link between transparency and governance. Next,
it brieﬂy discusses the history and importance of the EITI. It
then introduces readers to the research methods and data
sources employed by the authors before presenting the results
of our analysis. We then elaborate on why it is that the EITI
has a seemingly innocuous eﬀect on most of our governance
indicators, oﬀering four reasons why EITI countries may not
be outperforming others. We conclude with a few key implica-
tions for those interested in transparency, the resource curse,
and energy security.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Approximately 3.5 billion people live in countries with plen-
tiful oil, gas, and mineral reserves, yet a worrying number of
these countries do not release transparent information about
the extraction of those resources or how the revenues emanat-
ing from them are expended. 7 The existence of the so-called
‘‘resource curse” even implies that countries with an abun-
dance of minerals or hydrocarbons can exhibit comparatively
high levels of poverty and inequality, deteriorating environ-
mental quality, institutionalized corruption, and an increased
frequency of conﬂict and war. 8
However, political scientists, legal analysts, governance
scholars, and even ethicists have argued that transparency,
that is, ‘‘timely and reliable economic, social and political
information accessible to all relevant stakeholders,” 9 can par-
tially counteract some aspects of the resource curse and
improve social welfare. Access to information and transparent
frameworks for preserving that access have been known under
certain conditions to reduce corruption and improve social
stability. 10 One study looked at the relationship between cor-
ruption, deﬁned as the abuse of public oﬃce for private gain,
and transparency, deﬁned as access to information, in 150
countries, and found a ‘‘certain” correlation between lack of
transparency and high levels of corruption. 11 A second studyof 105 countries from 1960 to 2004 conﬁrmed that the absence
of transparency can signiﬁcantly and negatively impact eco-
nomic growth. That study documented such a strong ‘‘causal
relationship” across various sample sizes and timeframes that
it concluded that ‘‘the lack of transparency . . . is one of the
primary reasons for the subsequent poor growth record for
these countries.” 12 As economist Carolin Geginat adds, ‘‘An
institutional environment characterized by openness and
transparency is of central importance not only for private mar-
kets but also for the eﬀective and eﬃcient management of pub-
lic resources. Access to information can empower citizens to
monitor the quality of government services and the use of pub-
lic resources.” 13 ‘‘Transparency,” another study tells us, ‘‘is
often associated with more accountable, legitimate, eﬀective
and democratic governance.” 14
Conversely, critics of transparency respond that many
studies presume that the link is there to better governance
without specifying how or under which conditions it materi-
alizes. 15 These authors retort that a consensus is emerging
that ‘‘the right to information is not accountability in itself
but is instrumental to it, and transparency does not automat-
ically produce accountability but is a necessary but insuﬃ-
cient condition for it.” 16 In other words, the beneﬁts of
transparency are conditional and contextual 17: dependent
on things like the publicity condition (the capacity of the
population to understand and use information) and the
accountability condition (mechanisms that can sanction and
deter nontransparent behavior). 18 A slew of other, more crit-
ical studies suggest that transparency does not necessarily
promote better decision making, less corruption, and more
eﬀectiveness. 19
In sum, these contravening insights create an opportune
area of inquiry concerning the eﬃcacy of transnational rules
and transparency in the extractive industries sector.3. REVENUE TRANSPARENCY AND THE EITI
The EITI was formally born after the conclusion of the
‘‘Publish What You Pay” campaign in June 2003, when a
high-level meeting in the United Kingdom consisting of repre-
sentatives of governments, industries, and civil society groups
endorsed a common set of ‘‘EITI Principles.” The EITI pro-
cess was later endorsed at the annual summit of the G8 in
2004. 20 One year later, in 2005, a formal set of ‘‘EITI Crite-
ria” was agreed upon with further support from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund, and an International
Advisory Group was appointed with the task of managing
the EITI process. 21 An interim International EITI Secretariat
had been formed within the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), and in January 2005 it developed a
Sourcebook of ‘‘Guidance for EITI Implementation.” The
International Advisory Group, chaired by Transparency
International founder Peter Eigen, met ﬁve times throughout
2005 and 2006, quickly published an ‘‘EITI Validation
Guide,” and by the end of 2006 the EITI had a multi-
stakeholder board and the support of a permanent secretariat
to ‘‘manage the EITI at the international level.” 22 Near the
end of 2006, the EITI was registered as a formal not-for-
proﬁt organization in Norway, and a new and expanded
‘‘EITI Association” was adopted at the EITI Doha Confer-
ence in February 2009. 23
The key to the EITI is its ‘‘multi-stakeholder” approach to
transparency, involving three distinct sectors—government,
civil society groups, and corporations in the extractive indus-
tries. 24 In its most up-to-date form, the EITI promotes six
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tion” of ‘‘all material” oil, gas, and mining payments by com-
panies to governments (‘‘payments”) and all material revenues
received by governments from oil, gas, and mining companies
(‘‘revenues”). This publication must be disseminated to a wide
audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive, and compre-
hensible manner. Second, when such audits are lacking, pay-
ments and revenues are to be subject to a ‘‘credible,
independent audit” of reputable ‘‘international standards.”
Third, reporting of payments and revenues is to be reconciled
by an ‘‘independent administrator” which identiﬁes and cor-
rects discrepancies. Fourth, no companies are to be exempt
from EITI reporting, meaning it covers private companies,
public state-owned companies, and hybrid government-
linked companies. Fifth, the active engagement of civil society
is required in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of the
EITI process. Sixth, the public is to be kept informed by the
timely publication of ‘‘work plans” for how the host govern-
ments will manage their revenues, implement EITI reforms,
and assess capacity constraints. 25
The relatively broad coverage and participation in the EITI
compared with other voluntary schemes relates to the per-
ceived beneﬁts it brings to governments, companies, and com-
munities. As University of Illinois College of Law scholar A.
Friedman put it:
Compliance and candidacy under the EITI has a vast array of beneﬁts to
both countries and corporations. First, compliant and candidate countries
use their membership to strengthen the investment climate. It is a signal
to investors and ﬁnancial institutions that there will be increased trans-
parency, accountability and governance. It is also possible that this promise
will reduce violent conﬂict around the natural resource sectors. For corpo-
rations and investors, doing business in EITI Compliant countries reduces
both political and reputational risk. This, in turn, reduces costs by reducing
the need for or lessening the cost of risk insurance. As for the general pop-
ulation, it is generally advantageous to have more information in the public
arena through transparency, as well as the beneﬁts associated with greater
foreign direct investment. 26
The EITI has, moreover, contributed toward the solidiﬁca-
tion of transparency as a global norm in international
law. 27 New rules on mandatory disclosure of tax, royalties
and other payments to foreign governments are under way
in the United States, Canada, Norway and the European
Union, illustrating these countries’ commitment to the EITI’s
mission. 28 By enabling the provision of accurate information
about oil, gas, and mining revenues, it is claimed that the EITI
has helped bridge the schisms that can develop between soci-
ety, government, and industry. This ‘‘opening up of the
books” can build trust between stakeholders, hold govern-
ments more accountable for billions of dollars of revenue,
improve corporate image and the national investment climate,
and empower communities—all leading to ‘‘greater political
and social stability.” 29 Consequently, studies across the
disciplines of governance, 30 public administration, 31 law, 32
natural resources, 33 energy studies, 34 development studies, 35
business strategy, 36 corporate social responsibility, 37 and
political science 38 have all praised the EITI for its theory,
intent, or application.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
In this study, we ask: does the EITI matter? How do EITI
compliant countries perform and compare to others on metrics
associated with governance and economic development? Adetailed account of the metrics used in the analysis is given
below. We set out to test three groups of hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1a–1e are internal to the EITI—that is, they
measure whether governance and development outcomes
improve over time as a country moves from non-
membership to candidacy and then EITI compliance.
Hypotheses 1a–1e assess various, intuitive aspects of whether
the candidacy or compliance process actually relates to better
transparency outcomes:
H1a. The average change per year of governance and
economic development metrics in EITI countries is positive
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero during candidacy.H1b. The average change per year of governance and eco-
nomic development metrics in EITI countries is positive and
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero during compliance.H1c. Governance and economic development metrics in EITI
countries develop better during candidacy than Pre-EITI.H1d. Governance and economic development metrics in EITI
countries develop better during compliance than Pre-EITI.H1e. Governance and economic development metrics in EITI
countries develop better during compliance than during candi-
dacy.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b focus on the speciﬁc data that are dis-
closed in the EITI reports. Rather than just asking whether the
EITI works (as in H1a–H1e), these two hypotheses probe the
extent to which the EITI aﬀects governance and development
outcomes (i.e., whether it works better for certain countries—
those with more revenue streams covered and a higher number
of involved companies—than for others). The purpose of the
EITI is to uncover ﬁnancial streams that, if left undisclosed,
would provide opportunities for graft and corruption. To
attain compliant status, a country must report on up to eight
possible revenue streams. 39 Yet, in practice great variance
exists in how many revenue streams are reported. 40 We con-
jecture that the more revenue streams are covered in a coun-
try’s annual EITI report—that is, the more a country lives
up to the spirit of the EITI—the more positive the impact
on governance and development outcomes will be. The same
applies, mutatis mutandis, for the reported number of compa-
nies that participate.
H2a. The more revenue streams the EITI covers, the more
positive performance is on governance and economic devel-
opment metrics during candidacy and compliance.H2b. The stronger the involvement of the private sector (the
greater number of companies included when compiling data
for EITI reports), the more positive performance is on gover-
nance and economic development metrics during candidacy
and compliance.
Hypotheses 3a–3f are external, assessing how EITI countries
as a reference class compare to other country classes, notably
members of OPEC and Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
We selected OPEC countries, rich in oil and gas, to see if EITI
states outperformed those traditionally associated with the
‘‘resource curse,” and we selected LDCs to tease out whether
EITI states outperformed those that are the poorest and have
some of the lowest levels of government capacity:
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than that of non-EITI countries during candidacy, while there
is no diﬀerence Pre-EITI.H3b. Governance metrics of EITI countries develop better
than that of non-EITI countries during compliance, while
there is no diﬀerence Pre-EITI.H3c. Foreign direct investment in EITI countries develops
better than that of all OPEC countries during candidacy, while
there is no diﬀerence Pre-EITI.H3d. Foreign direct investment in EITI countries develops
better than that of all OPEC countries during compliance,
while there is no diﬀerence Pre-EITI.H3e. GDP per capita of EITI countries develop better than
that of all LDCs during candidacy, while there is no diﬀerence
Pre-EITI.H3f. GDP per capita of EITI countries develop better than
that of all LDCs during compliance, while there is no diﬀer-
ence Pre-EITI.(a) Study sample
This study analyzes the eﬀect of the EITI scheme on selected
governance metrics in EITI countries during 1996–2014. For
hypotheses 3a–3f, the development of governance metrics in
EITI countries is compared to the development of governance
metrics in non-EITI countries, OPEC countries and LDC
countries. EITI countries were deﬁned as all countries which
reached EITI compliant status until 2012 and which were
not suspended for longer than half a year. Countries which
reached compliance in the year 2013 were not included in
order to be able to analyze the change of governance metrics
during compliance. 16 EITI countries were thus deﬁned;
Table 1 lists these countries and shows their implementation
timeline.
Regarding the other country classes, non-EITI countries
were deﬁned as the 182 countries which did not reach EITI
Compliance Status until 2014. The twelve OPEC countries
are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,Table 1. EITI countries and the
Country EITI candidate in year EIT
Azerbaijan 2007
Ghana 2007
Iraq 2010
Kyrgyz Republic 2007
Liberia 2008
Mali 2007
Mauritania 2007
Mongolia 2007
Mozambique 2009
Niger 2007
Nigeria 2007
Norway 2009
Peru 2007
Tanzania 2009
Timor Leste 2008
Zambia 2009
Note: Central African Republic and Yemen not included due to suspension.
1 EITI (2014).Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and
Venezuela. 41 And the LDC class includes the following 48
countries: 42 Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhu-
tan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Djibouti,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao, Lesotho, Liberia, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome´ and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,
Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Yemen and Zambia.
It is important to note that EITI countries, OPEC countries
and LDCs are not mutually exclusive. So, when comparing
governance metrics of EITI countries with those of OPEC
countries or LDCs, one country can have a data set in multiple
classes.(b) Governance and economic development metrics
Eight governance and economic development metrics were
included in this study. Rather than drawing from dozens of
diﬀerent databases or sources, we instead sought to ﬁnd a sin-
gle source that was publicly accessible, inclusive in its coverage
of countries and time periods, and credible. As readers of this
journal likely know, the sheer array of indicators measuring
some type of governance is both mammoth and continues to
expand. Instead of falling prey to what has been termed ‘‘data
mashup” (Ravallion, 2012), we relied on the World Bank
because its data are fully available to all, comprehensive,
and peer-reviewed. We chose all six of the World Bank’s
‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators” (WGI) because they
draw from more than 30 other sources, which they synthesize
into their index, because they cover 214 countries, 43 and
the WGI ‘‘permit meaningful cross-country and over-time
comparisons.” 44 The WGI also hosts detailed appendices list-
ing methodological assumptions. One drawback to the dataset
is that the six WGI are not measured in absolute, but compar-
ative terms. Their indicators are all presented on a scale rang-
ing from approximately 2.5 to +2.5. A higher value
corresponds with a better governance performance. A second
drawback is that the WGI dataset focuses only on governance,ir implementation timeline1
I compliant since year EITI reports published in years
2009 2003–12
2010 2004–11
2012 2009–11
2011 2004–12
2009 2008–12
2011 2006–11
2012 2005–11
2010 2006–12
2012 2008–11
2011 2005–11
2011 1999–2011
2011 2008–12
2012 2004–12
2012 2009–12
2010 2008–11
2012 2008–11
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poverty, or economic development.
To ﬁll that gap, we also chose two metrics related to foreign
direct investment and per capita GDP. If the forces of the
EITI on transparency are as powerful as its advocates pro-
claim, then the expectation is that EITI Compliant countries
would outperform others in their rate of improvement on all
eight indicators. They would see scores for the six governance
indicators improve, inﬂows of foreign investment increase, and
growth in per capita GDP. A summary of all governance and
economic development metrics used in this study is given in
Table 2.
(c) Data analysis
Regarding hypotheses 1a–1e, per governance and economic
development metric and EITI country the average change per
year was calculated for three time spans:
 Phase A (Pre-EITI): Ranging from 1996 to 2002.
 Phase B (EITI candidacy): Ranging from 2002 to 2012.
 Phase C (EITI compliance): Ranging from 2012 to 2014.
In the next step, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the average change
per year between the three phases (and a dummy, zero-change
condition) were identiﬁed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
With a small n (like n = 16 in our sample), a non-parametric
test such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test brings more robust
results than its parametric counterparts (e.g., the dependent
t-test). 45
Regarding hypotheses 2a and 2b, the data were rearranged.
Each row corresponded to one published EITI report in the
sixteen EITI countries, including number of companies report-
ing, number of revenue streams included, and the change of six
governance metrics and two economic development metrics
from the publication year to the next year. This amountedTable 2. Description of governance and econom
No. Governance metric
1 Voice and accountability Reﬂects perceptions of the ex
government, as well as freed
2 Political stability and absence
of violence
Reﬂects perceptions of the l
unconstitutional or violent m
3 Government eﬀectiveness Reﬂects perceptions of the q
its independence from politic
the credibility of the govern
4 Regulatory quality Reﬂects perceptions of the a
regulations that permit and
5 Rule of law Reﬂects perceptions of the e
society, and in particular th
courts, as well as the likelih
6 Control of corruption Reﬂects perceptions of the e
petty and grand forms of co
7 Foreign direct investment, net
inﬂows (% of GDP)
Refers to the net inﬂows of
voting stock) in an enterprise
equity capital, reinvestment
the balance of payments. Re
reporting economy from for
8 GDP per capita (PPP, constant
2011 international $)
Refers to gross domestic pro
rates. An international dolla
United States. GDP at purch
the economy plus any produ
products. It is calculated wi
depletion and degradation oto a dataset with 101 rows. For each of the eight variables
measuring changes in governance or economic development
metrics two separate regression analyses were conducted, once
with number of companies reporting and once with number of
revenue streams included as independent variables.
Regarding hypotheses 3a–3f, per governance and economic
development metric and country the average change per year
was calculated for the same three time spans as hypotheses
1a–1e. In the next step, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the average
change per year in the three phases between EITI countries
and other country classes were identiﬁed using the non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This part of the analysis
follows a quasi-experimental research design. The randomiza-
tion necessary for an experimental research design is not feasi-
ble given the particular nature of our research question,
namely, to explore the eﬃcacy of the EITI’s voluntary trans-
parency standard on governance and development outcomes.
The use of analysis of variance and other similar tests does
not meet the experimental approach criteria. 46
In all conducted tests, we treat r = .1 (R2 = .01) as the
threshold for a small eﬀect, r = .3 (R2 = .09) as the threshold
for a medium eﬀect, and r = .5 (R2 = .25) as the threshold for
a large eﬀect. 47 Furthermore, we used boxplots to display our
results; a boxplot shows the minimum, the 25%-quartile, the
median, the 75%-quartile and the maximum of one research
variable in one speciﬁc country group.
Missing data were negligible in the EITI country class, and
not a big problem in the other country classes since the anal-
ysis mainly focused on cumulative values (like average changes
per year in one time span). Regarding EITI countries, there
were no missing data in the six WGI and GDP per capita anal-
yses, and two missing data points for Foreign Direct Invest-
ment. In the non-EITI country class, the missing data
amount to 15 data points. In the OPEC country class, the
missing data amount to one data point. And in the LDC class,
the missing data amount to 10 missing data points.ic development metrics used in this study
Description
tent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their
om of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
ikelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by
eans, including politically motivated violence and terrorism
uality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of
al pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
ment’s commitment to such policies
bility of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
promote private sector development
xtent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of
e quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
ood of crime and violence
xtent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
rruption, as well as ‘‘capture” of the state by elites and private interests
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in
fers to net inﬂows (new investment inﬂows less disinvestment) in the
eign investors, and is divided by GDP
duct converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity
r has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the
aser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in
ct taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
thout making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
f natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars
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The results indicate that, in a strong majority of governance
and economic development metrics, EITI countries did not
perform better than others. Seven of our hypotheses were
rejected outright, ﬁve were only partially conﬁrmed, and only
one was fully conﬁrmed. While keeping in mind that we did
not conduct an equal number of tests for each hypothesis, it
is interesting to note that out of a total of 72 tests, only 10 test
results were in line with our hypotheses. As a rough estimate,
performance on a healthy 86.1% of indicators went against our
stated hypotheses. However, it is worthy to note that both
within-country and between-country analyses seem to indicate
a positive development of regulatory quality and FDI during
EITI candidacy (2002–12), and of GDP per capita both during
EITI candidacy (2002–12) and EITI compliance (2012–14).
Our results regarding hypotheses 1a–1e are displayed in
Table 3. H1a was conﬁrmed for regulatory quality (medium
eﬀect), FDI (medium eﬀect) and GDP per capita (large eﬀect),
and rejected for all other governance and economic develop-
ment metrics. Only these three metrics are signiﬁcantly higher
than zero from 2002 to 2012. H1b was conﬁrmed for voice and
accountability, rule of law and GDP per capita (all medium
eﬀects), and rejected for all other governance and economic
development metrics. Only these three metrics are signiﬁcantly
higher than zero from 2012 to 2014. H1c was rejected for all
governance and economic development metrics: governance
and economic development metrics do not developTable 3. Median change per year of eight governance metrics in EITI countrie
Governance metrics Change per year
Phase A Pha
1996–2002 2002
Voice and accountability +0.02 +0
Political stability +0.01 +0
Government eﬀectiveness +0.01 +0
Regulatory quality +0.00 +0
Rule of law +0.02 0
Control of corruption +0.00 +0
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) +0.33 +0
GDP per capita +49.70 +10
a p < .05 (1-tailed); conducted tests are B > 0 (H1a), C > 0 (H1b), B > A (H1
Table 4. Summary of 16 regression analyses with number of included revenues an
average change per year during candidacy and complianc
Dependent variable Independent va
included revenu
b p-
Voice and accountability .07
Political stability and absence of violence .17
Government eﬀectiveness .11
Regulatory quality .07
Rule of law .02
Control of corruption .04
Foreign direct investment (in Mio. US$) .07
GDP per capita (in constant international $) .00signiﬁcantly better during EITI candidacy (2002–12) than
Pre-EITI (1996–2012). H1d and H1e were conﬁrmed for Rule
of Law (both medium eﬀects), and rejected for all other gover-
nance and economic development metrics. Only Rule of Law
develops signiﬁcantly better during EITI compliance (2012–
14) than both during Pre-EITI (1996–2002) and during EITI
candidacy (2002–12).
Hypothesis 2a and 2b were rejected for all governance and
economic development metrics The number of revenues
included and companies reporting in EITI reports do not have
any eﬀect on the average change of governance and economic
development metrics in the year after the EITI report was pub-
lished (see Table 4).
The results regarding hypotheses 3a–3f are displayed in
Table 5. Hypothesis 3a was conﬁrmed for regulatory quality
(small eﬀect), and rejected for all other governance and eco-
nomic development metrics. Only regulatory quality develops
better in EITI countries than Non-EITI countries from 2002
to 2012. In addition, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
development of regulatory quality between EITI and non-
EITI countries Pre-EITI (1996–2002). Hypothesis 3b was
rejected for all governance and economic development met-
rics: there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the development
of governance and economic development metrics between
EITI and non-EITI countries from 2012 to 2014. Hypothesis
3c was conﬁrmed: the change per year in foreign direct invest-
ments is higher in EITI countries than OPEC countries from
2002 to 2012 (medium eﬀect), while there is no equivalents in three phases and results of Wilcoxon tests regarding hypotheses 1a–1e
per time span Wilcoxon
se B Phase C Sig.a T r
–12 2012–14
.00 +0.02 C > 0 1.86 .33
.00 0.04 – – –
.00 0.04 – – –
.02 0.01 B > 0 2.02 .36
.00 +0.04 C > 0 2.69 .48
C > A 1.71 .30
C > B 2.33 .41
.00 0.02 – – –
.32 0.99 B > 0 2.22 .39
7.59 +116.57 B > 0 3.46 .61
C > 0 2.79 .49
c), C > A (H1d), C > B (H1e); only signiﬁcant test results are displayed.
d number of reporting companies in EITI reports as independent variable and
e of eight country indicators as dependent variables
riable: number of
es in EITI reports
Independent variable: number of
companies reporting in EITI reports
value R2 b p-value R2
.50 .01 .04 .69 .00
.08 .03 .01 .93 .00
.26 .01 .09 .35 .01
.52 .00 .01 .89 .00
.86 .00 .04 .66 .00
.69 .00 .12 .23 .02
.48 .01 .07 .51 .00
.99 .00 .04 .73 .00
Table 5. Median change per year of eight governance metrics in EITI countries and comparison group in three phases and results of Wilcoxon tests regarding
hypotheses 3a–3f
Governance metrics Time span Changes in median per year and country
group
Wilcoxon
EITI-countries Comparison groupa Sig.b W r
Voice and accountability 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.02 0.01 YES 17,504 .20
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2012–14 (Compliance) +0.02 +0.02 – – –
Political stability 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.01 +0.00 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2012–14 (Compliance) 0.04 +0.02 – – –
Government eﬀectiveness 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.01 +0.00 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2012–014 (Compliance) 0.04 +0.01 – – –
Regulatory quality 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.02 +0.00 YES 17,597 .17
2012–14 (Compliance) 0.01 +0.00 – – –
Rule of law 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.02 +0.00 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2012–14 (Compliance) +0.04 +0.03 – – –
Control of corruption 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.00 +0.00 – – –
2012–14 (Compliance) 0.02 +0.01 – – –
Foreign direct investments 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +0.33 +0.06 – – –
2002–12 (Candidacy) +0.32 0.07 YES 127 .41
2012–14 (Compliance) 0.99 0.10 – – –
GDP per capita 1996–2002 (Pre-EITI) +49.70 +23.79 YES 1,198 .31
2002–12 (Candidacy) +107.59 +43.24 YES 1,231 .34
2012–14 (Compliance) +116.57 +35.63 YES 1,237 .33
aNon-EITI countries for six WGI (H3a, H3b), OPEC countries for FDI (H3c, H3d), LDC’s for GDP per capita (H3e, H3f).
b p < .05 (1-tailed), YES if median of EITI countries greater than comparison group.
ENERGY GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL RULES, AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 185signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the Pre-EITI phase. Hypothesis 3d was
rejected: the change per year in foreign direct investments is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in EITI countries and OPEC coun-
tries from 2012 to 2014. Hypotheses 3e and 3f were rejected:
While GDP per capita develops better in EITI countries than
LDC’s from 2002 to 2012 as well as from 2012 to 2014 (both
medium eﬀects), it also develops better in the Pre-EITI phase
(1996–2002), which amounts to a medium eﬀect as well.
6. DISCUSSION
A strong indication regarding positive eﬀects of the EITI ini-
tiative on governance and economic and development metrics
would be if during candidacy and/or compliance the following
criteria would be met:
(1) changes per year in EITI-countries are signiﬁcantly
higher than zero,
(2) changes per year in EITI-countries are signiﬁcantly
higher than Pre-EITI, and
(3) changes per year in EITI-countries are signiﬁcantly
higher than those in other country groups, while there
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the Pre-EITI phase.
Not a single one of the eight researched governance and eco-
nomic development metrics meets all of these three criteria for
either the candidacy or the compliance phase (let alone in both
phases). Only three metrics meet two of these criteria for eithercandidacy or compliance phase, as Figure 1 summarizes: the
change per year in EITI countries in both regulatory quality
and foreign direct investment during candidacy is signiﬁcantly
greater than zero and higher than the country comparison
group while not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the country compar-
ison group in the Pre-EITI phase (however, the changes per
year are not higher during candidacy than Pre-EITI). And
regarding rule of law, the change per year in EITI countries
during compliance is signiﬁcantly greater than zero and higher
than both during candidacy and Pre-EITI (however, the
change per year of EITI-countries during compliance is not
signiﬁcantly higher than the change per year in non-EITI
countries). Furthermore, it is worthy to note that both
within-country and between-country analyses seem to indicate
a positive development of GDP per capita both during EITI
candidacy (2002–12) and EITI compliance (2012–14); how-
ever, the same can be said for the Pre-EITI phase as well
(1996–2002).
So, does the EITI lead to a better performance in gover-
nance and economic development metrics, or do mostly coun-
tries which already are on a good track regarding these metrics
decide to participate in the EITI? Our results tentatively
support the latter: There was not a single governance and
economic development metric in which EITI countries per-
formed better during EITI candidacy or EITI compliance than
Pre-EITI as well as better than other country classes.
While keeping in mind the limitations of our empirical anal-
ysis, especially regarding the short EITI compliance phase, the
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Fig. 1. Boxplots of average changes per year of eight governance and economic development metrics in three time spans for EITI countries and comparison
groups (all minima and maxima not fully displayed).
186 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfocus on general country metrics which are not exclusive for
the extractive industry, and the quasi-experimental research
design lacking additional factors which might interact with
the EITI scheme, based on our ﬁndings we can tentatively con-
clude that EITI has an insubstantial role at aﬀecting key gov-
ernance and development indicators. Why? In this part of the
paper, we postulate four possible explanations:
 The EITI is constrained by a limited mandate.
 The EITI is voluntary and non-binding. Public and private actors often resist EITI
implementation.
 The EITI seems unable to catalyze strong civil society
institutions.
(a) Limited mandate
One basic challenge is that the EITI focuses only on rev-
enues from the extractive industries in countries rich in
ENERGY GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL RULES, AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 187resources. This takes a ‘‘narrow” view of transparency, as it is
only a small part of public sector revenues. Even other aspects
of the oil, gas, and mining fuel cycle, such as environmental
impact assessments, project siting, or community relocation,
are excluded. The EITI, moreover, does not address how those
revenues are expended; it merely makes their amounts more
precisely known to outside groups. As one commentator crit-
icized:
[The EITI is problematic because it focuses] on transparency in government
oil revenue, or the ﬁnancial ﬂows between the oil industry and national trea-
suries, and misses where the corruption is often far worse: in government
spending. 48
Relatedly, until recently about half of EITI countries pub-
lished aggregate data about revenues but not individual data
about particular companies (on the private side) or ministries
and departments (on the government side), making it diﬃcult
to determine precisely where the money went, though the new
EITI standard adopted in Sydney in May 2013 requires disag-
gregated reporting. One critique is that ‘‘the EITI initiative is
not only narrow, but it also gives priority to the wrong set of
issues in resource-rich countries . . . since the spread of corrup-
tion starts at the early stages involving contracts and procure-
ment, the EITI is introduced too late in the process to have
much of an eﬀect.” 49
Another aspect of the limited mandate is the fact that EITI
currently is unable to monitor or track illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows—
that is, money that beneﬁts a select group of elites (local or
foreign) instead of the general public. 50 This suggests that
although EITI’s reporting requirements can result in improved
transparency in the extractive sector overall (and thus could
explain the rather positive development of the regulatory qual-
ity metric we found in our analysis), they would not necessar-
ily inﬂuence resource revenue that is pocketed or illegitimately
transferred for peoples’ private beneﬁt. Although net revenues
from natural resources is estimated at about $1 trillion for
low-income and lower middle-income countries, much of this
amount is lost through illicit ﬁnancial transactions. This
occurs for ﬁve main reasons, according to Le Billon. 51 First,
extractive industries are often under high-level political con-
trol. Second, there is rampant blurring of the lines between
public, shareholder, and personal interests especially in the
case of state-owned companies. Third, limited competition in
the extractive sector results in fewer transactional checks and
balances compared to other sectors that are more competitive.
Fourth, the complex technical and ﬁnancial processes of
extractive sectors require high-level expertise and thus lead
to companies, instead of governments, doing much of the
accounting for tax payments mostly in developing countries.
This leaves room for misappropriation in cases where auditing
is limited or corrupt. Fifth, although resource-rich countries
are often highly integrated into the global economy, the chan-
nels of integration are often limited, opening avenues for illicit
ﬁnancial ﬂows. It is expected that a better disaggregation of
data as part of EITI reporting mechanism can help. Also, ele-
ments of tax justice should be integrated into the governance
agenda of the initiative in order to be relevant to the discussion
of illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows. 52 This is simply because it is almost
impossible to examine ﬁnancial ﬂows between governments
and extractive companies without engaging with the discus-
sion of alternative routes money can take.
(b) Voluntary rather than mandatory compliance
Another fundamental weakness of the EITI is that it is
purely a voluntary approach, where governments areencouraged but not required to adhere to the principles of trans-
parency. This means that only governments and companies
committed to integrity and transparency will join. 53 Or, as
one legal scholar remarked, ‘‘corporations have strong incen-
tives to agree to nondisclosure demands made by resource-rich
countries” and ‘‘unaccountable governments have equally
strong incentives not to change.” 54 One survey noted that com-
panies wishing to evade taxes or to quickly maximize proﬁts
will opt out of participating in the EITI or will leave countries
about to join the EITI. 55 Moreover, for countries that do join
voluntarily, there are no sanctions against noncompliance other
than rejecting a country’s Candidate status—there are no ﬁnes,
criminal charges, or other penalties. This may create opportuni-
ties for window-dressing. Corrupt and nontransparent compa-
nies and countries have an incentive to join the EITI in the
knowledge that, in a best case scenario, they gain increased pres-
tige and recognition at low cost and, in a worst case scenario,
they lose little to nothing if expelled from the EITI. 56
As a sign of its limited coverage, although a few dozen coun-
tries have participated so far, more than 130 countries around
the world produce and extract oil and 86 countries extract sig-
niﬁcant amounts of coal. Angola, the country whose report
from Global Witness inspired the creation of the entire EITI
framework, has not joined. China, another major global actor
in resource extraction, has also refrained from participating. 57
In the Western world, although the U.S. has been an EITI
candidate since March 2014, it was only the ﬁrst G8 country
to do so. Canada is also yet to become a part of it. This exam-
ple speaks to the issue of a double standard since the extractive
sectors of this country are not necessarily devoid of trans-
parency concerns. 58 The other point is that the voluntary nat-
ure of the initiative does not make it as forceful. Since Canada
is considered a global leader in the extractive industries sec-
tor, 59 it is simply surprising—to say the least—that it is yet
to become an EITI member. And although the U.S. has
joined, there is still very little to show in terms of real changes
in the sector. 60 The question here is simple: with the absence
of global pacesetters in the extractive sector supported by the
fact that it is voluntary, why would one expect the initiative to
be eﬀective in its agenda?
Unsatisﬁed with the EITI voluntary regime by itself, both
the United States (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010) and the EU
(Accounting Directive, 2013) have in recent years adopted
mandatory disclosure rules for the extractive industries. Yet
these rules are unlikely to bear immediate eﬀect. It has taken
some time to transpose the EU directive into national law
and the U.S. rules have faced stiﬀ opposition from the oil
industry. When the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) tried to enact the new disclosure rules under Sec-
tion 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2012, the American Pet-
roleum Institute ﬁled a lawsuit against the SEC, which it won.
In 2014, Oxfam America successfully ﬁled another lawsuit
against the SEC for its delay in crafting new rules. In an ‘‘ex-
pedite schedule,” the SEC committed to adopt new rules by
June 2016.
(c) Public and private sector resistance
In some circumstances, the EITI can damage companies and
communities. Corporate leaders have stated that the voluntary
nature of the EITI can put participating companies at a ‘‘com-
petitive disadvantage” when they have to disclose information
about royalties within the EITI countries they operate in. 61
Other companies have ‘‘objected strongly” to the publishing
of production-sharing agreements on public websites. 62 Some
members of civil society have been harassed and intimidated
188 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfor participating in the implementation of the EITI, others
have seen travel permits and visas denied, and still others have
seen legal and procedural obstacles thrown in their way to pre-
vent them from fully participating. 63 In 2006, for example,
two members of the civil society coalition involved in promot-
ing the EITI in the Republic of the Congo were arrested and
imprisoned. 64
In the case of Liberia, internal disputes between EITI’s
multi-stakeholder group (MSG) and the Publish What You
Pay civil society coalition led to their representatives not
attending the MSGmeetings for over a year. This occurred after
the ﬁrst head of the LEITI Secretariat resigned in 2010. 65 In
Azerbaijan, civil liberties are at risk. The growth of civil society
in general has been stunted, partly due to the inﬂuence of Wes-
tern actors whose major interest is in the country’s oil and gas
resources. 66 The other contributing factor is the fact that Pres-
ident Ilham Aliyev in early 2014 signed a series of constitutional
amendments restricting the ability of civil society organizations
to operate freely, particularly requiring them to provide a great
deal of information or risk being ﬁned or shut down. This is a
person who was named Corruption Person of the Year in
2012 for his family’s share in lucrative industries. 67 It is interest-
ing that a country that was once a trailblazer for the EITI now
faces these basic challenges that undermine the initiative’s very
own MSG agenda. More surprising is the fact that a World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group report rates the EITI in
Azerbaijan as ‘‘highly eﬀective” in terms of oil revenue trans-
parency measures. 68
Although public participation is essential for the success of
the initiative, the public often tends to be a ‘‘silent partner”,
thereby limiting the potential of the EITI to be a formidable
counterbalance to corruption. 69 A survey conducted in 2008
on the 23 countries and 38 ﬁrms that were committed to the
initiative at that time had some revealing insights regarding
the level of participation or partnership that exists between
the so-called key stakeholder groups:
The public must be able to comprehend what the multi-stakeholder group
reports about how the government uses and records resource revenues.
However, EITI is constrained by many factors including illiteracy, liveli-
hood demands, lack of interest, and/or cultural and political factors. For
example, in many developing countries, public discussion of oil and mining
revenues is discouraged, particularly in Africa. 70
Another survey conducted in 2011 by the Liberian EITI sec-
retariat and a local media NGO found that only 42% of
respondents know of EITI’s existence, with most of them hav-
ing a vague knowledge of how it works. 71 This is a change
from the period where town hall meetings around the country
would attract over 300 people in each case, and resource rev-
enue discussions would ensue in all corners of the country.
(d) Dependence on strong civil society
For the EITI to work, it needs strong civil society institu-
tions. Indeed, even for transparency to work eﬀectively, infor-
mation must become ﬁrmly embedded in the everyday
decision-making practices of information producers and con-
sumers, creating a transparency ‘‘action cycle.” 72 Yet in many
countries, especially those most prone to corruption, non-
governmental organizations remain disorganized, weak, or
even nonexistent. Moreover, the EITI criterion that civil
groups have to be ‘‘actively engaged as a participant in the
design, monitoring and evaluation of this process and con-
tribute towards public debate” can functionally exclude the
process from starting in countries until suﬃcient civil society
capacity exists. 73 Even then, Yale Law School scholar Alex
Kardon comments that ‘‘achieving transparency may not curethe curse where civil society is not strong enough to convert
information into accountability.” 74 Joseph Bell, one of the
experts from Columbia University who helped draft an oil
management law for the small island of Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´n-
cipe, also admits that ‘‘transparency cannot [by itself] ensure
the responsible use of resource revenues.” 75
An evaluation of EITI in Madagascar, for instance, noted
that a lack of civil society meant that powerful mining compa-
nies were able to successfully override eﬀorts to achieve ‘‘good
governance,” transparency, and proper engagement with com-
munities. 76 The researchers found that the absence of civil
society meant that personal gain from extractive industry con-
tracts was still the largest determinant of which projects go
forward, and that, due to pressure from companies and the
presence of corruption, national leaders were more concerned
with courting investment and maximizing revenues than with
transparency.
Civil society participation is actually deemed one of the
major setbacks of the EITI—not in terms of it not being some-
thing useful to do, but rather the fact that the so-called ‘‘part-
nership” is really not that genuine. 77 The prevailing challenge
is that the ‘‘EITI does not obligate an implementing govern-
ment to be open, accountable, and engaged with its citizenry
on extractive revenues. Thus, it is eﬀective only in those coun-
tries willing to inform groups of citizens and to allow these cit-
izens to use this information to challenge government.” 78 This
suggests that governments that resist democratic practices
would be least interested in giving a voice to civil society
groups on the table, and the EITI secretariat in Norway can-
not really do anything about this because it is a voluntary
endeavor. This remains a basic ﬂaw of the initiative,
particularly as its advocates over-emphasize the utility of
multi-scalar governance arrangements and public–private
partnerships.7. CONCLUSION
Our statistical analysis suggests that the EITI has not yet
been as successful as its advocates may want us to believe. Par-
ticularly judging from the fact that the performance in gover-
nance and economic development metrics of EITI countries is
almost never better during EITI candidacy and compliance
than Pre-EITI, it can make one wonder if the EITI has
impacted governance and development outcomes in
resource-rich countries. To be sure, our analysis indicates pos-
sible positive eﬀects of the EITI initiative on regulatory qual-
ity, rule of law and foreign direct investment, and it is
important to note that our data are limited to the period
1996–2014. Thus, it might not be able to capture slow, more
incremental improvements in governance and development
outcomes over the longer term (especially since the ﬁrst coun-
tries to reach EITI compliant status did so as recently as 2009).
Furthermore, our analysis follows a quasi-experimental design
and allows for only correlative interpretations regarding the
relationship between EITI participation and governance and
economic development metrics, primarily due to the fact that
we did not include other factors which might interact with the
EITI scheme, such as speciﬁc characteristics of political sys-
tems, national and local regulations, and other development
indicators such as literacy or public health. This study there-
fore opens up promising prospects for further research into
the eﬀectiveness of the EITI that may involve additional vari-
ables, longer time frames and in-depth country case studies.
Compliance with the EITI is no doubt going to be a perpet-
ual challenge for companies 79; but it is certainly going to be a
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well. In the ﬁrst place, transparency alone is not the answer as
there are many other aspects of resource governance that need
to be factored into the equation for a holistic solution. This
point questions the transformative potential of transparency,
as other scholars have done. 80 A counter-intuitive potential
downside of transparency is worth noting at this juncture.
The EITI can have a prophylactic eﬀect on oil and gas devel-
opment, since both governments and companies, knowing that
they are being monitored, will signiﬁcantly change their
behavior. Development experts Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig
explain that ‘‘a public sector that is to always keep the public
informed on all details of its activities will not be very eﬀective
in pursuing its activities. In other words, if you keep a diary of
everything you do, you won’t be doing much.” 81
The EITI has the potential to make negotiations between
governments and companies more complex and cumbersome,
since parties involved in the process may be more cautious
about exchanging information they know will make it into
the public sphere. Ironically, transparency cannot only make
it easier to detect corruption; it can also identify the relevant
oﬃcials to approach for bribes and kickbacks. 82 This critique
is not meant to tarnish the eﬀorts toward transparency in the
extractive sectors because, as the 2014 EITI Progress Report
indicates, transparency does matter. 83 Nonetheless, our con-
clusion here is rather straightforward: Just as transparencycannot be seen as the magic bullet, it is one that is unable to
penetrate armor. So it is almost impossible to think of the
EITI as a panacea for good resource governance or perhaps
sustainable development in resource-rich countries. 84
Another concern is that the EITI came into being as one of
the practical steps to guide resource-rich countries out of the
‘‘resource curse”. 85 But it has become clear that the cure for
the curse, if it actually exists in the way it has been popular-
ized, is not easy to ﬁnd. To showcase the complexity of this
issue, scholars who propound the idea have identiﬁed several
factors that can aﬀect the extent of the curse including the abil-
ity of governments (institutions) to manage large resource rev-
enues in a sustainable manner, 86 the types of resources the
country in question has, 87 and the nature of rent seeking that
occurs. 88 Others have insisted that we assess the historical and
present socio-political variables that have made some coun-
tries use resources for their beneﬁt while others have failed
at doing so. 89 As multifaceted as the resource curse idea is,
EITI has not served the discussion well through its simplistic
focus on revenues and transparency. The cure should have sev-
eral ingredients the EITI currently lacks, thereby enhancing
the initiative’s potential to become transformative. Being
entirely voluntary, it remains unclear if this desire to impact
real change in the discussion of resource curse, transparency,
accountability, and broad socio-economic development would
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